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DOMESTIC RELATIONS
Peter N. Swisher*
Victoria Bucur**
I. 1985 LEGISLATION***
A. Virginia Premarital Agreement Act
Premarital agreements, or antenuptial contracts, are generally
favored by the law when prospective spouses privately contract to
vary, limit, or relinquish certain rights which they would otherwise
acquire in each other's property, or in each other's estate, by rea-
son of their impending marriage. Traditionally, premarital agree-
ments were made by widows, widowers, or divorced older people,
who wished to retain control of property acquired in a prior mar-
riage and, upon death, pass such property on to the children of
that prior marriage."
However, premarital agreements are now becoming more com-
mon among young professionals and first marriages since
[w]ith divorce such a commonplace fact of life, it is fair to assume
that many prospective marriage partners whose property and famil-
ial situation is such as to generate a valid antenuptial agreement
settling their property rights upon the death of either, might want
to consider and discuss also . . . the disposition of their property
and ... [spousal support] rights ... in the event their marriage,
despite their best efforts, should fail.2
The problem with this "divorce planning" in premarital agree-
* Professor of Law, T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond; B.A., 1966,
Amherst College; M.A., 1967, Stanford University; J.D., 1973, University of California, Has-
tings College of Law.
** T.C. Williams School of Law, University of Richmond, Class of 1986.
* Note: Due to pending proposals regarding enforcement and support schedules, the
amendments to VA. CODE ANN. § 20-79.1 (Cum. Supp. 1985) will be discussed in a subse-
quent issue.
1. See H. CLARK, LAW OF DoamsTic RELATIONs 27-31 (1968); A. LINDEY, 2 SEPARATON
AGREEMENTS AND ANTsE-NuriAL CoNmAcTs § 90, at 90-50 (1985); Gamble, The Antenuptial
Contract, 26 U. MIAMI L. REv. 692 (1972).
2. Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381, 384 (Fla. 1970), quashed on other grounds, 257 So. 2d
530 (Fla. 1972).
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ments is that many courts have held such agreements to be void
per se since they may tend to "induce" or "facilitate" divorce in
violation of a state's public policy promoting marriage.3
Because of the substantial uncertainty as to the enforceability of
these various provisions in premarital agreements, and due to a
significant lack of uniformity among the states, the National Con-
ference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws approved and
recommended for enactment in all states The Uniform Premarital
Agreement Act (Uniform Act). 4 This Act was adopted with certain
modifications by the Virginia General Assembly in the 1985 Ses-
sion as the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act (Virginia Act).5
The new Virginia Act, assuming it is re-enacted prior to July 1,
1986,e would apply to any premarital agreement executed on or af-
ter this date." The premarital agreement must be in writing and
signed by both parties. It will be enforceable without considera-
tion, and effective upon marriage.' However, the premarital agree-
ment is not enforceable if the person against whom enforcement is
sought proves that the person: (1) did not execute the agreement
voluntarily; and (2) was not provided a fair and reasonable finan-
cial and property disclosure by the other party, and did not waive
in writing the right to that disclosure."
Any issue of unconscionability in such a premarital agreement
3. See Swisher, Divorce Planning in Antenuptial Agreements: Toward a New Objectiv-
ity, 13 U. RICH. L. REv. 175, 177-89 (1979); see also Cumming v. Cumming, 127 Va. 16, 29,
102 S.E. 572, 576 (1920) (alimony provisions in a premarital agreement invalid). But see
Cooley v. Cooley, 220 Va. 749, 752, 263 S.E.2d 49, 52 (1980) (divorce planning with property
in post-nuptial agreements valid); Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 380, 219 S.E.2d 901, 903
(1975) (same).
4. Reprinted in [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA) 201:0121 (1984) [hereinafter cited as
Uniform Act].
5. VA. CODE ANN. §§ 20-147 to -154 (Cum. Supp. 1985) [hereinafter cited as Virginia Pre-
marital Agreement Act].
6. 1985 Va. Acts 434 (3) provides that "this act shall not be effective unless reenacted
prior to July 1, 1986."
7. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-147 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
8. Id. § 20-149. Actually, the "almost universal view" is that the marriage itself is the
consideration for this premarital agreement. Uniform Act, supra note 4, § 2 comment.
Since the agreement is effective "on marriage," the intent of the drafters of the Uniform
Act was that postnuptial and separation agreements are outside the scope of the Act; non-
married related "cohabitation agreements," such as found in Marvin v. Marvin, 18 Cal. App.
3d 660, 557 P.2d 106, 134 Cal. Rptr. 815 (1976), modified, 122 Cal. App. 3d 871, 176 Cal.
Rptr. 555 (1981), are also outside the scope of the Uniform Act. See Uniform Act, supra
note 4, §§ 1, 4 comments.
9. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151(A)(1), (2) (Cum. Supp. 1985). These provisions are similar
to § 6(a)(1), (2) of the Uniform Act, supra note 4.
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would be decided by the court as a matter of law,10 and recitations
10. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151(B) (Cum. Supp. 1985). This is similar to the Uniform Act,
supra note 4, § 6(c). Such issues of unconscionability may well include any breach of fiduci-
ary duty between the parties, or the lack of independent legal counsel to advise each party
prior to signing the agreement. See Batleman v. Rubin, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519 (1957)
(competent legal advice a necessary requirement for enforcement of an antenuptial agree-
ment). The test for "unconscionability" under the Uniform Act was drawn from the Uni-
form Marriage and Divorce Act, § 306, reprinted in [Reference File] FAM. L. REP. (BNA)
201:2001 (1984) [hereinafter cited as Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act]. See Uniform Act,
supra note 4, § 6 comment; see also Newman v. Newman, 653 P.2d 728 (Colo. 1982) (uncon-
scionability in an antenuptial agreement makes it unenforceable on that ground alone);
Ferry v. Ferry, 586 S.W.2d 782 (Mo. 1979) (circumstances surrounding signing of the agree-
ment made the agreement unenforceable).
Section 306 of the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act provides as follows:
Section 306. [Separation Agreement.]
(a) To promote amicable settlement of disputes between parties to a marriage at-
tendant upon their separation or the dissolution of their marriage, the parties may
enter into a written separation agreement containing provisions for disposition of
any property owned by either of them, maintenance of either of them, and support,
custody, and visitation of their children.
(b) In a proceeding for dissolution of marriage or for legal separation, the terms of
the separation agreement, except those providing for the support, custody, and visi-
tation of children, are binding upon the court unless it finds, after considering the
economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence produced by
the parties, on their own motion or on request of the court, that the separation
agreement is unconscionable.
(c) If the court finds the separation agreement unconscionable, it may request the
parties to submit a revised separation agreement or may make orders for the dispo-
sition of property, maintenance, and support.
(d) If the court finds that the separation agreement is not unconscionable as to
disposition of property or maintenance, and not unsatisfactory as to support:
(1) unless the separation agreement provides to the contrary, its terms shall be
set forth in the decree of dissolution or legal separation and the parties shall be
ordered to perform them, or
(2) if the separation agreement provides that its terms shall not be set forth in
the decree, the decree shall identify the separation agreement and state that the
court has found the terms not unconscionable.
(e) Terms of the agreement set forth in the decree are enforceable by all remedies
available for enforcement of a judgment, including contempt, and are enforceable
as contract terms.
(f) Except for terms concerning the support, custody, or visitation of children, the
decree may expressly preclude or limit modification of terms set forth in the decree
if the separation agreement so provides. Otherwise, terms of a separation agree-
ment set forth in the decree are automatically modified by modification of the
decree.
Id.
The problem with this interpretation is that under Virginia law, separation agreements,
and arguably premarital agreements, are fixed-not modifiable, as they are in most
states-regarding spousal support. See VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(H) (Cum. Supp. 1984); id.
§ 20-109 (Repl. Vol. 1983). But if the premarital agreement is unfair to the parties or to
either of them, a Virginia judge still has the option to void the premarital agreement in
whole or in part. See, e.g., Batleman, 199 Va. 156, 98 S.E.2d 519; see also VA. CODE ANN. §
20-154 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (Va. Premarital Agreement Act's severability clause).
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in the agreement would create a prima facie presumption that they
are factually correct." Any statute of limitations applicable during
the action is tolled during the marriage, but equitable defenses
limiting the time for enforcement, including laches and estoppel,
are available to either party.12
What may be included in a premarital agreement under the Vir-
ginia Act? Parties to a premarital agreement under the Virginia
Act may contract regarding: (1) the right to manage and control
property, whenever and wherever acquired or located; (2) the dis-
position of property upon "separation, marital dissolution,"' death,
or the occurrence or nonoccurrence of any other event"; (3) spousal
support; (4) the making of a will, trust, or other agreement; (5) life
insurance ownership rights; (6) the choice of law governing the
agreement; and (7) "any other matter, including their personal
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute
imposing a criminal penalty.' 4
It is also important to note that the Virginia Act did not adopt
all its provisions directly from the Uniform Act; and noticeably al-
tered were those provisions relating to spousal and child support.
For example, where the Uniform Act allows the parties to contract
with respect to "the modification or elimination of spousal sup-
port,""5 the Virginia Act only speaks of "spousal support" gener-
ally.16 What was the Virginia legislative intent in making this
change? Since modification or elimination of spousal support is
one of the key factors in premarital agreement divorce planning, 7
11. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-151(b) (Cum. Supp. 1985). There is no similar provision in the
Uniform Act. If the recitations were fraudulently made in the premarital agreement, how-
ever, the presumption that they are "factually correct" could still be overcome. See, e.g., In
re Estate of Harris, 431 Pa. 293, 245 A.2d 647 (1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1065 (1969)
(misrepresentation of a party's worth in an antenuptial agreement voided that agreement).
12. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-152 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
13. The Uniform Act, supra note 4, uses the term "marital dissolution" to mean divorce.
However, in Virginia the word "dissolution" generally means annulment. See, e.g., Hender-
son v. Henderson, 187 Va. 121, 46 S.E.2d 10 (1948) (the meaning of the word "dissolve" is to
annul); VA. CODE ANN. 20-107.1 to -107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985). It would have been better to
add the word "divorce" in the Virginia Premarital Agreement Act to avoid any possible
ambiguity, but perhaps "any other matter" is a catch-all term which would also cover di-
vorce under VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150 (Cum. Supp. 1983). This was, possibly, a legislative
oversight.
14. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150 (Cum. Supp. 1985) (a modification of the Uniform Act, supra
note 4, § 3).
15. Uniform Act, supra note 4, § 3(a)(4).
16. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150(4) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
17. See Swisher, supra note 3, at 183-85.
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and apparently was one of the primary motives for the Uniform
Act,'8 it would be unfortunate if a judge narrowly construed the
Virginia Act's "spousal support" provision to prohibit any modifi-
cation or elimination of spousal support. It could be argued that
the general term "spousal support" includes, but is not limited to,
its modification and possible elimination, and that the legislative
intent for this change might have been to promote the concept of
spousal support generally, rather than specifically to emphasize its
modification or elimination. Alternately, a judge might still hold
the modification or elimination of spousal support in a premarital
agreement to be valid under the Virginia Act section 20-150(8). 19
The Virginia Act's spousal support provision thus will require fur-
ther clarification.
The Virginia Act also deleted section 6(b) of the Uniform Act
which provides:
If a provision of a premarital agreement modifies or eliminates
spousal support and that modification or elimination causes one
party to the agreement to be eligible for support under a program of
public assistance at the time of separation or marital dissolution, a
court, notwithstanding the terms of the agreement, may require the
other party to provide support to the extent necessary to avoid that
eligibility.Y0
Again, there is no express legislative intent explaining why this
provision was omitted in the Virginia Act and what effect, if any,
this omitted provision has on the Virginia Act's spousal support
provision.2
Finally, the Uniform Act provides under section 3(b) that "the
right of a child to support may not be adversely affected by a pre-
marital agreement, '22 but the Virginia Act omits this provision.
The rule in Virginia, and in almost all states, is that courts gener-
18. See supra note 4 and accompanying text.
19. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-150(8) (Cum. Supp. 1985) provides that the parties to a premari-
tal agreement may contract with respect to "[a]ny other matter, including their personal
rights and obligations, not in violation of public policy or a statute imposing a criminal
penalty." But compare the divorce planning public policy arguments in Cumming v. Cum-
ming, 127 Va. 16, 102 S.E. 572 (1920) (any antenuptial agreement encouraging a divorce is
void) with Capps v. Capps, 216 Va. 378, 219 S.E.2d 901 (1975) (such agreements are not
void unless collusive or made to facilitate a separation or divorce).
20. Uniform Act, supra note 4, § 6(b).
21. See infra notes 55-59 and accompanying text.
22. Uniform Act, supra note 4, § 3.
19851
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ally are not bound by marital agreements affecting child support,23
and therefore section 3(b) of the Uniform Act would not appear to
be in conflict with Virginia law. Perhaps the provision was omitted
from the Virginia Act because it might have been superfluous or
ambiguous. Whatever the reasons may be for these deviations from
the Uniform Act, the Virginia Act will merit closer scrutiny and
need further clarification.
B. Equitable Distribution Statutory Modifications24
The 1985 General Assembly made some important changes in
the Virginia equitable distribution statute. 25 Except for changing
the word motion to request in the statute's introduction, 2 and
adding a provision which allows a court to retain jurisdiction to
later partition martial property which is titled in the names of
both parties;2 7 the modifications made to the statute all relate to
pensions.
The primary motivation in revising section 20-107.3 of the Code
of Virginia was to override a Virginia Attorney General's opinion,28
followed by some judges and rejected by others, which concluded
that a pension division by the court was not authorized under the
statute.29 Under the revisions, "all property including that portion
of pensions, profit sharing or retirement plans of whatever na-
ture" was added to the definition of marital property.30 Addition-
23. See, e.g., Hammers v. Hammers, 216 Va. 30, 216 S.E.2d 20 (1975) (court has continu-
ing jurisdiction to modify contract for child support); Carter v. Carter, 215 Va. 475, 211
S.E.2d 253 (1975) (court unquestionably has the power to modify agreements concerning
child support); Gloth v. Gloth, 154 Va. 511, 153 S.E. 879 (1930); VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108
(Repl. Vol. 1983). These cases, however, dealt with separation agreements rather than pre-
marital agreements.
24. The authors gratefully acknowledge a helpful analysis of this statutory modification
written by Richard E. Crouch, Esq., of Arlington, Virginia. See Crouch, 1985 Legislation
Changes Rules on Dividing Pension, 6 VA. FAM. L. NEws 8 (1985) (the Newsletter of the
Family Law Section of the Va. State Bar).
25. H. 358, 1985 Va. Acts 5, amending and re-enacting VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 relating
to property of the parties upon divorce or annulment.
26. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A) (Cum. Supp. 1985). The change in wording from "mo-
tion" to "request" for a decree as to the property of the parties on divorce or annulment was
reportedly made because some judges were requiring counsel to file notice and calendar sep-
arate motions for property division as a precondition to equitable distribution, and some
surprised attorneys heard these judges tell them that they had "no motions" before them
for equitable distribution. See Crouch, supra note 24, at 10.
27. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(C) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
28. 1982-83 Op. Att'y Gen. 209 (Va. 1983).
29. Crouch, supra note 24, at 8.
30. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
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ally, subsection G of the statute was re-written to provide that
the court may direct payment of a percentage of pension, profit
sharing or retirement benefits, whether vested or nonvested, paya-
ble in a lump sum or over a period of time and only as benefits are
payable. No such payment shall exceed fifty percent of the cash
benefits actually received by the party against whom such award is
made."1
Finally, subsection C of the statute, providing that the court shall
have no authority to order a conveyance of separate property, or of
marital property not titled in the names of both parties, was
amended to read: "This subsection shall not be construed to pre-
vent the court from directing payment of a percentage of pension,
profit sharing or retirement benefits as authorized under subsec-
tion G. .... 32
These changes in the statute were wise and helpful, because in-
terpreting substantive items of property-like pensions, profit-
sharing and retirement benefits-as criteria rather than as marital
property per se 33 made the former Virginia statute peculiar to au-
thorities outside the state, and difficult to explain to judges.3 4
Moreover, such an interpretation under the former statute might
have left the question of whether pensions and other retirement
plans are marital property open to litigation on a case-by-case
analysis, and some courts in states that have not defined pension
and retirement plans as marital property by statute have held that
such pensions were not marital property.3 5
Overall, the present statute still presents some unresolved ques-
tions. Under the revised subsection G, "[t]he court may direct pay-
ment of a portion of the wage earner spouse's pension to the other
spouse only when those benefits become due.' '3 6 The former sub-
31. Id. § 20-107.3(G) (emphasis added).
32. Id. § 20-107.3(C) (emphasis added).
33. See, e.g., id. § 20-107.3(E)(8). Under the former statute, pensions and profit sharing
and retirement plans were not explicitly included in the definition of marital property in
subsection (B)(2), but were only included under subsection (E)(8) as criteria for the court to
consider in making an award. Under the new statute, however, marital property is defined,
under subsection (B)(2), to include these items.
34. Crouch, supra note 24, at 8.
35. See, e.g., Grant v. Grant, 9 Kan. App. 2d 671, 685 P.2d 32 (1984) (military retirement
pay not a marital asset); Smith v. Smith, 280 S.C. 257, 312 S.E.2d 560 (1984) (pension fund
of husband not marital property).
36. VA. CODE ANN. § 10-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1985) (emphasis added).
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section G, however, apparently went further in prohibiting any
monetary award which was in any way "based upon the value of
pension or retirement benefits . ..until the party against whom
such award is made actually begins to receive such benefits. '37
Thus under the revised statute a judge may arguably award the
equivalent of up to half the value of the pension or retirement
benefits to the non-employee spouse in cash under section 20-
107.3(D) before the wage-earner spouse actually receives those
benefits. In so doing, the judge would technically not be "directing
payment of a percentage of pension, profit sharing or retirement
benefits" in violation of subsection G.5 An opposing argument to
this approach is that even "awarding" the pension to a wage-
earner spouse is controlled by the language of subsection G, and
cannot be done by silence or implication. The theory behind this
second approach would be based on the court's statutory duty
under section 20-107.3(A) to put a "price tag" on every marital as-
set in preparation for making a monetary award authorized by sec-
tion 20-107.3(D).39 In choosing either approach, given the wording
of section 20-107.3(D), the judge would not seem to be very limited
in his or her ultimate decision.4 °
II. JUDICIAL CASES
A. Federal Jurisdiction in Father-Son Intentional Infliction of
Emotional Distress Case
For the past two hundred years, American domestic relations
matters have largely been subject to the control of the individual
states,41 rather than the federal courts. Although federal courts are
not constitutionally prohibited from hearing domestic relations
matters,42 the United States Supreme Court has stated in dicta
that federal courts should not exercise jurisdiction in domestic re-
lations matters,43 unless incidental to some primary property or
37. Id. § 20-107.3(G) (Repl. Vol. 1983) (emphasis added).
38. Id. § 20-107.3(G) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
39. Crouch, supra note 24, at 10.
40. Id.
41. See Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888) (legislature of state or territory controls
marriage requirements); see also Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 376 (1971).
42. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1; 28 U.S.CA § 1332 (West Cum. Supp. 1985) (juris-
diction of district courts based on diversity of citizenship).
43. See, e.g., In re Burrus, 136 U.S. 586 (1890) (disclaimer of jurisdiction in child custody
determinations); Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582 (1859) (disclaimer of any jurisdic-
tion for divorce).
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tort claim. This traditional federal "hands off" rule has become
known as the "domestic relations exception" to federal diversity
jurisdiction.
Recently, however, decisions by the Fourth Circuit Court of Ap-
peals 44 and other federal courts45 have been eroding this jurisdic-
tional exception to the point where it soon may no longer be an
exception at all.46 Raftery v. Scott,47 a recent case in point, exem-
plifies this trend.
In Raftery, the former husband, a New York resident, sought
damages for intentional infliction of emotional distress from his
former wife, a Virginia resident, by reason of the wife's alleged in-
tentional efforts to destroy the father-son relationship. The United
States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia rendered
judgment in favor of the former husband and against the former
wife for forty thousand dollars in compensatory damages and ten
thousand dollars in punitive damages-a judgment affirmed by the
Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals.48
The wife's attorney argued that the domestic relations exception
should apply to defeat federal jurisdiction. The Fourth Circuit
court, however, paraphrasing the language of Cole v. Cole,'49 held
that a federal district court "may not simply avoid all diversity
cases having intrafamily aspects. Rather it must consider the exact
nature of the rights asserted or of the breaches alleged."50 Also cit-
ing from Wasserman v. Wasserman,51 the Raftery court noted,
"the torts of child enticement and intentional infliction of emo-
tional distress are in no way dependent on a present or prior fam-
ily relationship. . . . Most importantly, appellant [wife] is not
seeking a determination of entitlement to custody or any other ad-
justment of family status ... .
The Raftery court was very careful, however, not to explicitly
44. See, e.g., Wasserman v. Wasserman, 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982); Cole v. Cole, 633
F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
45. See, e.g., Bennett v. Bennett, 682 F.2d 1039 (D.C. Cir. 1982); Fenslage v. Dawkins, 629
F.2d 1107 (5th Cir. 1980).
46. See Raftery v. Scott, 756 F.2d 335, 341-44 (4th Cir. 1985) (Michael, J., concurring).
47. 756 F.2d 335 (4th Cir. 1985) (applying Virginia law in federal diversity of citizenship
action).
48. Id. at 336.
49. 633 F.2d 1083 (4th Cir. 1980).
50. Raftery, 756 F.2d at 338 (paraphrasing the language of Cole, 633 F.2d at 1087).
51. 671 F.2d 832 (4th Cir. 1982).
52. 756 F.2d at 338 (quoting Wasserman, 671 F.2d at 834-35).
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undermine the domestic relations exception. It stated that a fed-
eral court decision "not requiring the adjustment of family status
or establishing familial duties or determining the existence of a
breach of such duties, does not contravene the domestic relations
exception to federal diversity jurisdiction"--a consideration espe-
cially applicable in Raftery since the tort complained of was not
"alienation of affection," but rather a claim for intentional inflic-
tion of emotional distress.5 4
Nevertheless, in a lengthy concurring opinion, Judge Michael
questioned whether the facts of Raftery adequately distinguished
it from cases in which the domestic relations exception was prop-
erly applicable:
It is true that on a technical basis the tort of intentional infliction
of emotional distress can be successfully prosecuted without any ref-
erence to the marital relation, and it is on this pivot that Cole, Was-
serman, and the instant majority opinion turn.
Yet, the record below clearly shows that the jury was advised of
the former domestic relationship and of the actions of the mother
toward the child and against the interests of the father. Only the
most meticulous honing of the differentiation sought to be set out
by these three cases can support the leap in logic which says that
the domestic relationship between the parties is of no moment in
the prosecution of the instant case. 55
Presenting a hypothetical situation of a husband in Bluefield,
Virginia, who moves two blocks away from his wife into Bluefield,
West Virginia, and then sues for divorce in federal court, Judge
Michael surmised:
Even if we assume that what remains of the domestic relations ex-
ception after Cole, Wasserman, and the instant case do[es] not per-
mit the federal court to grant the divorce, the narrow circumscrip-
tion of that doctrine by those opinions might just as well permit the
district court to go to that extent, since essentially the evidence ap-
propriate to determining the status of the parties as to divorce will
then be before the court. After all, federal courts still retain chan-
cery jurisdiction. U.S. Const., art. III, § 2, cl. 1. Since the Federal
53. Id. (citing with approval Kelser v. Anne Arundel County Dep't of Social Servs., 679
F.2d 1092 (4th Cir. 1982)).
54. Id. at 338-39.
55. Id. at 342 (Michael, J., concurring).
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Court will be sitting with diversity jurisdiction, applying the law of
the Commonwealth of Virginia in this assumed case, the only bar to
the granting of a divorce is whatever remains of the domestic rela-
tions exception after Cole, Wasserman, and the instant case.56
If a narrowing of the domestic relations exception is to be brought
about, concluded Judge Michael, it should be done by congres-
sional action rather than by a judicial "whittling away process. ' '57
Whether federal jurisdiction in domestic relations-oriented cases
"will be a rare occasion or one of increasing frequency" '58 will have
a substantial impact on this important area of the law, and this
author shares the belief that federal jurisdiction in this area is defi-
nitely increasing. As to whether this trend will be beneficial or det-
rimental, only time will tell.
B. Spousal Rape
Two recent Virginia Supreme Court cases have established a
very limited exception to the common law concept of spousal rape
immunity: Weishaupt v. Commonwealth59 and Kizer v. Common-
wealth.60 In Weishaupt, the husband and wife had maintained
separate residences, refraining from any sexual contact and speak-
ing only on matters concerning their infant daughter. After ap-
proximately eleven months of continuous separation, the husband
attempted to have sexual relations with his estranged wife. He was
indicted for rape, and his motion to dismiss based on the common
law spousal exemption to rape was denied. A jury found Mr.
Weishaupt guilty of attempted rape. On appeal, the Virginia Su-
preme Court examined "whether a husband can be guilty of raping
his wife .. .where, at the time of the alleged offense the parties
were living separate and apart."61
It was Mr. Wieshaupt's contention that the English common law
contained an absolute marital rape exemption which should apply
in Virginia.62 The court, however, rejected that contention, holding
56. Id.
57. Id. at 343.
58. Id. at 342.
59. 227 Va. 389, 315 S.E.2d 847 (1984).
60. 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
61. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 392, 315 S.E.2d at 847.
62. Id. at 395, 315 S.E.2d at 849. In support of this position, he advanced three argu-
ments: (1) because no state statute specifically alters the common law rule, it is still in
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that the implied consent to sexual relations in a marriage could be
revoked. Tracing this notion through three English cases,6" the
court stated: "[T]he true state of English common law was that
marriage carried with it the implied consent to sexual intercourse;
but that consent could be revoked. The requirement for revocation
was that there exist either a court order of separation or one limit-
ing contact, or that there exist a separation agreement entered into
by both husband and wife."'6 4
The English courts thus did not recognize that a woman could
unilaterally revoke the implied consent by moving out and filing
for a divorce. The Virginia Supreme Court, however, reasoned that
in interpreting relevant statutory and case law, only those princi-
ples of common law not repugnant to the "nature and character of
our political system" should be adopted.65 In light of recent cases
in Virginia establishing a woman's independent control over her
property, the court concluded she should have the same protection
and control over her physical person. 6
The court also found that the Virginia no-fault divorce statute
"embodies a legislative endorsement of a woman's unilateral right
to withdraw an implied consent to marital sex."67 If the state failed
to recognize the wife's ability to unilaterally withdraw the implied
consent to marital sex, then it would have to also deny the wife's
effect; (2) the Virginia Supreme Court's past usage of the word "unlawful" in defining rape
indicates an acceptance of the common law exemption for marital rape; and (3) denying
spousal exemption to rape charges would necessarily destroy any possibilities for reconcilia-
tion. Id. at 395, 315 S.E.2d at 850.
63. The three English cases were Regina v. Clarke, [1949] 2 All E.R. 448 (order of separa-
tion revoked wife's consent); Regina v. Miller, [1954] 2 All E.R. 529 (despite fact wife had
filed for divorce, no court order existed, and therefore consent not revoked); Regina v.
O'Brien, [1974] 3 All E.R. 663 (entry by court of decree nisi operated to revoke wife's im-
plied consent to marital intercourse).
64. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 399, 315 S.E.2d at 852.
65. Id. (quoting Foster v. Commonwealth, 96 Va. 306, 310, 31 S.E. 503, 505 (1898)). After
the court refused to adopt the English common law approach, Weishaupt's first argument
was summarily dismissed. In regard to his second contention, the court noted that it had not
used the word "unlawful" in a rape case since 1956, despite deciding approximately 150 such
cases since then. Thus, if the use of that word had meant acceptance of the English rule,
then the more recent elimination of "unlawful" must have meant rejection of the rule. The
court dismissed the third contention as absurd, reasoning that where a marriage had deteri-
orated to the point that intercourse must be had by violence, there would be little hope for
reconciliation. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 404, 315 S.E.2d at 855; see supra note 22.
66. Id. at 403, 315 S.E.2d at 853.
67. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 402-03, 315 S.E.2d at 854; see VA. CODE ANN. § 20-91(9) (Repl.
Vol. 1983).
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statutory right to withdraw from the marriage contract. 8
The Weishaupt court concluded that, as there was no challenge
to the sufficiency of the evidence to prove the crime of attempted
rape, Mr. Weishaupt's conviction should be affirmed. In so holding,
the court stressed three requirements for the recognition of unilat-
eral revocation of consent:
[A] wife can unilaterally revoke her implied consent to marital sex
[despite the fact that no legal divorce or separation has occurred]
where, as here, she has made manifest her intent to terminate the
marital relationship by living separate and apart from her husband;
refraining from voluntary sexual intercourse with her husband; and,
in light of all the circumstances, conducting herself in a manner that
establishes a de facto end to the marriage.6
Recently, however, in Kizer v. Commonwealth,7 0 the Virginia
Supreme Court clarified Weishaupt so as to significantly limit the
impact of that decision. In Kizer, the couple had not consistently
maintained separate residences, though they were living apart at
the time of the alleged rape. The marital history was replete with
trial separations and attempts to make the marriage work. At one
point the couple sought legal advice concerning a final separation,
but no further action was taken. After a lengthy separation period,
the husband gained entrance to the apartment- and had forcible
sexual intercourse with his wife. The husband was later indicted
and convicted of rape. 1
In considering whether the commonwealth had established be-
yond a reasonable doubt the elements necessary to sustain a con-
viction for marital rape, the court relied on a broad interpretation
of its Weishaupt holding. The majority opinion noted that, under
Weishaupt, the wife's revocation of consent must be demonstrated
by her manifest intent to terminate the marital relationship. The
requisite intent could only be shown by meeting the three factual
requirements discussed in Weishaupt.7 2
The court found sufficient evidence to show a violation of the
rape statute, but insufficient evidence to satisfy the third
68. Weishaupt, 227 Va. at 404, 315 S.E.2d at 855.
69. Id.
70. 228 Va. 256, 321 S.E.2d 291 (1984).
71. Id. at 258-60, 321 S.E.2d at 292-293.
72. Id. at 260, 321 S.E.2d at 293 (1984); see supra text accompanying note 69.
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Weishaupt factor required to show the requisite intent. Although
the couple had lived separate and apart and refrained from volun-
tary, sexual intercourse, the commonwealth failed to demonstrate
that the wife had, in light of all the circumstances, conducted her-
self in a manner that established a de facto (or actual) end to the
marriage. The attempts to reconcile, the wife's remaining in a
jointly rented apartment, and the aborted trip to her attorney in-
dicated a lack of objective intent to terminate the marital relation-
ship on the part of the wife.73
In deciding the case on the basis of the failure to meet the third
Weishaupt factor, the court concomitantly clarified what it had
meant by that requirement. Though recognizing that it was clear
the wife in Kizer had subjectively considered their marriage "frac-
tured beyond repair, 7 4 the court stressed that her intent was not
manifested objectively to her husband. The majority concluded
that a wife's conduct must be such that the husband perceived, or
reasonably should have perceived, that the marriage actually was
ended in order to meet the third Weishaupt requirement. 5 Thus
Mr. Kizer's conviction was reversed.
Virginia has essentially adopted the notion of a rebuttable pre-
sumption of consent by the wife-victim. This theory was first ad-
vanced in State v. Smith.7 6 In that case, the prosecution argued
that the presumption of consent could be rebutted by proving the
use of "more than minimal" physical violence by the husband. 7
The idea behind such a compromising notion is that it protects the
wife's interest in prosecution, while retaining the theory of implied
consent.78 Accordingly, under the Smith court's approach, a pre-
sumption of consent by the wife-victim exists until evidence of vio-
lence is shown.
73. Kizer, 228 Va. at 260-61, 321 S.E.2d at 293-94.
74. Id. at 261, 321 S.E.2d at 294.
75. Id. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Carrico, argued that the
majority had, in fact, added another required condition. Weishaupt, he argued, had only
required that the wife's intent to terminate the marriage be clear to the objective ob-
server-not necessarily to the husband. The result of this shift means the court must stand
in the shoes of the husband, a biased perspective as compared to the court's traditional role
as an objective observer of the facts. Justice Thomas reasoned that this charge will ulti-
mately work to make it more difficult for a wife to establish the necessary requirements for
a conviction of spousal rape. Id. at 263-64, 321 S.E.2d at 295-96 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
76. 148 N.J. Super. 219, 372 A.2d 386 (Essex County Ct. 1977), aff'd, 169 N.J. Super. 98,
404 A.2d 331 (App. Div. 1979), rev'd on other grounds, 85 N.J. 193, 426 A.2d 38 (1981).
77. 148 N.J. Super. at -, 372 A.2d at 392.
78. Comment, Spousal Exemption to Rape, 65 MARQ. L. REv. 120, 126 (1981).
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In Virginia, the additional proof of violence required to rebut the
presumption of consent is replaced by the requirement that a wife
manifest her intent to end the marriage. A married woman must
not only provide sufficient evidence to sustain a conviction under
the rape statute, but must also prove the requisite intent by satis-
fying the three factual requirements established in Weishaupt.
The result of the supreme court's clarification of that third re-
quirement, however, is to place a much more arduous burden on a
victim of spousal rape than that borne by a victim of rape by a
stranger or even a fiancee.79
C. Child Custody Decisions
Two recent Virginia Supreme Court cases help delineate the
boundaries of what classifies an individual as an unfit parent. In
Roe v. Roe, 0 a mother sued to regain custody of her nine-year-old
daughter after discovering her ex-husband was openly involved in
a homosexual relationship. Despite findings that the daughter was
"a very happy child [who] seemed to be well adjusted and outgo-
ing,""1 the court awarded sole custody to the mother. In the court's
opinion, the exposure of the child to the homosexual relationship
formed the basis of finding the father an unfit parent.
The court relied on Brown v. Brown,82 where removal of two
boys, ages four and seven, was requested because the mother had
been openly living in an adulterous relationship. The court ex-
plained that it was not the relationship in the abstract that made
the mother a morally unfit parent, but her "exposure of the chil-
dren to an immoral and illicit relationship which rendered her an
unfit and improper person to have their custody. '83
Thus, in Roe, it was not the father's sexual preference that
formed the basis for removal, but the exposure of the child to that
preference which provided evidence of the father's unfitness. The
court considered it in the best interests of the child to remove her
from a situation that would "inevitably afflict her relationships
with her peers and with the community at large." 4 Custody was
79. Kizer, 228 Va. 256, 263, 321 S.E.2d 291, 295 (1984).
80. 228 Va. 722, 324 S.E.2d 691 (1985).
81. Roe, 228 Va. at 725, 324 S.E.2d at 692.
82. 218 Va. 196, 237 S.E.2d 89 (1977).
83. Roe, 228 Va. at 727, 324 S.E.2d at 697.
84. Id. at 728, 324 S.E.2d at 694.
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awarded to the mother, and visitation by the father was to be de-
termined by the trial court with the limitation that no visitation
occur in the father's home or in the presence of the homosexual
lover.
It appears from the holdings in both Roe and Brown that the
dividing line between fit and unfit is determined by deciding
whether or not the child is exposed to the "immoral" relationship.
Of particular interest was the Roe court's quick notation that in
both cases the relationships involved activities punishable by law;
adultery as a class four misdemeanor, and sodomy as a class six
felony. 5 Even more important to the court was the social condem-
nation associated with the father's homosexual relationship. Roe
may seem at first to indicate that as society's opinion and expecta-
tions change, a different result may occur. However, this is unlikely
in light of the court's definitive statement that "[t]he father's con-
tinuous exposure of the child to his immoral and illicit relationship
renders him an unfit and improper custodian as a matter of law.""8
In Patrick v. Byerley,87 the court found that abandonment of a
child without justification also establishes parental unfitness. The
mother had left her son so she could live with another man. She
later sought custody from the stepmother, Byerley, who had pro-
vided a home for the boy since his father's disappearance. Follow-
ing initiation of the custody suit the boy told both the court and
an examining psychiatrist that he wished to stay with Byerley
whom he loved very much.88
The court recognized that under Judd v. Van Horn 9 the law
presumes the child's best interest will be served when in the cus-
tody of its parent. However, the Byerley court held that the
mother's voluntary abandonment of the boy at age four and one-
half months adequately rebutted the Judd presumption. This fact
provided clear, cogent and convincing evidence that the natural
mother was an unfit parent as a matter of law. In addition, the
trial court found that Byerley cared for the boy as a member of her
own family for the last three and one-half years, that the Byerley
home provided the only stable environment the boy had ever ex-
perienced, and that the child expressed his preference to remain
85. Id.
86. Id.
87. 228 Va. 691, 325 S.E.2d 99 (1985).
88. Id. at 694, 325 S.E.2d at 100.
89. 195 Va. 988, 81 S.E.2d 432 (1954).
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with Byerley. These factors persuaded the supreme court to affirm
the holding awarding Byerley custody.9"
In James v. James, 1 however, the court held that the Judd pre-
sumption had not been rebutted simply by a showing that the
child's parents exhibited open hostility toward each other. The
chancellor had found both parents to be unfit because of their
open hostility and had-awarded custody of the divorced couple's
children to their grandparents. The supreme court, however, ruled
that such hostility was common in divorce cases and did not con-
stitute "an extraordinary reason for taking a child away from its
parent, or parents. '92
The cases of Gray v. Gray93 and Armistead v. Armistead94 in-
volved varied determinations concerning custodial hearings. In
Gray the mother sought court permission to move with her chil-
dren to Arizona. The chancellor found that such a move would be
in the best interests of the children, but that in light of Carpenter
v. Carpenter95 he could not permit such a move. In Carpenter the
mother had wished to move from Norfolk, Virginia, to New York
City. The court considered all relevant factors and found "the best
interest of the children would not be served by moving them to
New York."9' However, in Gray, the trial court had already made
the determination that the move would, in fact, be in the best in-
terests of the children-a determination which was not even an is-
sue on appeal. The supreme court therefore concluded it was error
to deny her request as, "Carpenter merely holds that before a
court permits a custodial parent to remove children from the Com-
monwealth, it must determine that removal is in the children's
best interest. '97
Armistead involved the question of whether a chancellor may
limit the evidence given at a custodial hearing. A temporary dispo-
sition of custody was made and proved unsatisfactory, requiring a
second attempt for a final determination by the court. The chan-
cellor found that at the time of the temporary order all issues con-
90. Id. at 995-96, 81 S.E.2d at 436.
91. 230 Va. _ 2 V.L.R. 139 (1985).
92. Id. at , 2 V.L.R. at 142 (quoting Wilkerson v. Wilkerson, 214 Va. 395, 397-99, 200
S.E.2d 581, 583 (1973)).
93. 228 Va. 696, 324 S.E.2d 677 (1985).
94. 228 Va. 352, 322 S.E.2d 836 (1984).
95. 220 Va. 299, 257 S.E.2d 845 (1979).
96. Id. at 302, 257 S.E.2d at 848.
97. Gray, 228 Va. at 698, 324 S.E.2d at 678.
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cerning the mother's fitness as a parent had been determined."8
On appeal, the supreme court found that the temporary order
did not have a conclusive effect sufficient to preclude reconsidera-
tion of the mother's fitness as a parent. Instead, the court held
that all evidence relevant to the determination of the best interests
of the child must be reviewed. The court applied the holding of
Keel v. Keel,99 involving similar circumstances, which stated:
It would serve no useful purpose for us to examine the evidence bit
by bit to determine what was relevant and what was not. Suffice it
to say that we are convinced from the record that the most appro-
priate action is for the trial court to reexamine all the evidence in
light of this opinion."'
Accordingly, the supreme court ordered that "all the evidence al-
ready in the record as well as any new evidence the parties may
submit relevant to the determination of Judith's [the child's] best
interests" be reviewed. 1°1
D. Procedural Issues
In Mitchell v. Mitchell,02 the Virginia Supreme Court consid-
ered whether a woman who had been personally served but failed
to appear before the court for divorce proceedings was entitled to a
rehearing under the provision of section 8.01-322 of the Code of
Virginia. 03 The court carefully reviewed the historical perspective
of the relevant section and concluded that under the Code of Vir-
ginia "a petition for rehearing could only be filed by one against
whom service was made by publication.'104 The purpose of section
8.01-322 was to protect a party who has no knowledge of litigation
affecting him or her, by allowing that party a two-year period fol-
lowing the judgment during which be or she may file a petition for
rehearing. 10 5 As the wife had been served personally, however, the
98. Armistead, 228 Va. at 355, 322 S.E.2d at 837.
99. 225 Va. 606, 303 S.E.2d 917 (1983).
100. Id. at 613, 303 S.E.2d at 922.
101. Armistead, 228 Va. at 357, 322 S.E.2d at 838.
102. 227 Va. 31, 314 S.E.2d 45 (1984).
103. VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-322 (Repl. Vol. 1984).
104. Mitchell, 227 Va. at 36, 314 S.E.2d at 48.
105. Id. at 38, 314 S.E.2d at 48. That two-year period may be shortened to one year if the
party is actually served with notice of the judgment more than one year prior to the end of
the two-year term.
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statute was not applicable and she was not allowed to petition for
a rehearing, regardless of whether she met that section's two-year
statute of limitations requirement. The court held that a defen-
dant who has received personal service and fails to protect his or
her interests "accepts the risk of an unfavorable result" and is "be-
yond the intendment of the statute." 106
Burts v. Burts1 0 7 presented another procedural issue concerning
child and spousal support provisions in a final divorce decree. The
supreme court reviewed whether a woman was denied due process
by a trial court which excluded her from proceedings concerning
those provisions and which allowed only the attorneys for each side
to attend. The court found that the procedure adopted denied the
wife her opportunity to be heard, and the case was remanded to
determine a final decree for child and spousal support.10 8
Wells v. Weston'09 presented the court with the opportunity to
review the circumstances leading to a spousal support agreement.
Upon remarriage by the wife, her ex-husband stopped support
payments which the agreement provided should continue as long
as the wife was alive. Because the court found no impropriety or
unethical conduct on the part of the drafting attorney, no evidence
of constructive fraud existed. Without clear, cogent and convincing
evidence of constructive fraud, the settlement was enforceable. 110
In addition, the court found that mutual assent by the parties
had occurred. Because the husband was aware of the provisions
requiring support payments to continue until the wife's death, he
could not later claim mutual assent was lacking. He executed the
agreement which was not obscure or technical in meaning. The
court concluded his signature manifested a reasonable intent to be
bound, and a party's mental reservation could not impair the con-
tract purported to be entered."'
E. Recent Court Decisions on Equitable Distribution
As of this writing, the Virginia Supreme Court has7 yet to decide
any equitable distribution divorce cases interpreting section 20-
106. Id. at 38, 314 S.E.2d at 48-49.
107. 227 Va. 618, 316 S.E.2d 745 (1984).
108. Id. at 620, 316 S.E.2d at 746.
109. 229 Va. 72, 326 S.E.2d 672 (1985).
110. Id. at 77, 326 S.E.2d at 675.
111. Id. at 74, 326 S.E.2d at 677.
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107.3 of the Code of Virginia.112 However, two Virginia circuit
court decisions, Gold v. Gold 3 and Smoot v. Smoot,"4 have
received wide attention in Virginia State Bar newsletters'" and
continuing legal education seminars," 6 and are worthy of note in
this survey.
In Gold, a Virginia two-man oral surgery practice was evaluated
in a divorce proceeding under equitable distribution concepts, and
a question arose as to whether or not the "professional goodwill" of
this dental practice constituted marital property under section 20-
107.3 of the Code of Virginia. Although other states have split in
determining whether or not professional goodwill constitutes mari-
tal property,117 Judge Trabue cited from Wood v. Pender-Doxey
Grocery Co." 8 and Dugan v. Dugan,"9 holding that professional
goodwill would constitute marital property in the context of a den-
tal practice. 20
Judge Trabue accepted the opinions of Dr. Gold's accountants
that professional goodwill should be considered as part of the total
property evaluation, and the court accepted a modified book value
approach (taking into account what a willing buyer would pay and
a willing seller would accept) as the proper criterion to be used in
evaluating this professional practice.' 2 '
In Smoot, the husband was reimbursed out of the proceeds of
the jointly-titled marital home for his contribution from former
separate property received by him prior to the marriage. In this
case, Judge Sarver relied on a "source of the funds" rule as enunci-
ated in the Maryland case of Harper v. Harper which held that
112. VX CODE ANN. § 20-107.3 (Cum. Supp. 1985).
113. Ch. No. 631-1982 (Cir. Ct. Roanoke County; Nov. 10, 1983), reprinted in 1 Va. Cir.
390 (1985).
114. Ch. No. 2232 (Cir. Ct. Shenandoah County; May 29, 1984), reprinted in 6 VA. FAK L.
NEws 7 (1985).
115. Gold, supra note 113, was also reprinted in 5 VA. FAm. L. NEWS 10 (1984).
116. Gold, supra note 113, and Smoot, supra note 74, were also reprinted in materials for
the 1985 Virginia Trial Lawyers Association Annual Seminar.
117. Compare Vugan v. Dugan, 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983) (professional goodwill con-
stitutes marital property) with Holbrook v. Holbrook, 103 Wis. 2d 327, 309 N.W.2d 343
(1981) (professional goodwill does not constitute marital property).
118. 151 Va. 706, 144 S.E. 635 (1928). "[G]ood will is one of those intangible assets of an
established business difficult to describe and impossible of valuing with mathematical preci-
sion, but, with all, of very real existence and of substantial value." Id. at 712, 144 S.E.2d at
637.
119. 92 N.J. 423, 457 A.2d 1 (1983); see supra note 117.
120. Gold, 1 Va. Cir. at 397-400.
121. Id. at 396, 400.
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when property is acquired by an expenditure of both nonmarital
and marital property, the property is characterized as part
nonmarital and part marital.122 A spouse contributing nonmarital
property is therefore entitled to an interest in the ratio of the
nonmarital investment to the total nonmarital and marital invest-
ment in the property, and the remaining property is characterized
as marital property subject to eqluitable distribution.123 However,
this "source of the funds" theory contrasts with an "inception of
title" theory adopted by some courts, which states that property
can be either separate or marital, but not both.
124
It is not clear which of these two theories the Virginia Supreme
Court will adopt. Smoot can be distinguished from Harper, since
the Smoot property was jointly titled and definitely marital,
whereas the Harper property in Maryland dealt with separately ti-
tled property to which the other party claimed contribution. More-
over, Virginia Code section 20-107.3(A)(1) provides: "Income re-
ceived from, and the increase in value of, separate property during
the marriage is separate property," assuming this hypothetical
property is maintained as separate property. 2 5 Arguably, this stat-
ute implies that a Virginia court might have to apply the "incep-
tion of title" doctrine in such a situation, but this question will
have to be clarified by the Virginia Supreme Court.
122. 294 Md. 54, _ 448 A.2d 916, 929 (1982); see also Tibbetts v. Tibbetts, 406 A.2d 70,
77 (Me. 1979) "[W]here marital together with non-marital funds are invested, the marital
estate is entitled to a proportionate return on its investment.").
123. Smoot, 6 VA. FAM. L. NEWS at 7-8 (an appeal of Smoot is presently pending in the
Virginia Supreme Court).
124. See, e.g., Fisher v. Fisher, 86 Idaho 131, 383 P.2d 840 (1963); In re Marriage of
Smith, 86 Ill. 2d 518, 427 N.E.2d 1239 (1981); Cain v. Cain, 536 S.W.2d 866 (Mo. Ct. App.
1976).
125. VA. CODE ANN. § 20-107.3(A)(1) (Cum. Supp. 1985).
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